


A DELINEATION OF HUMAN NEEDS WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF A SITUATIONAL THEORY

by Manfred Hörz



The unknown X of human beings
as the broken symmetry of beauty.

1. Introduction

Uneasiness about the one-dimensionality and fragmentary character of science has become a commonplace. But even problems within a particular science cannot be solved by monistic approaches either. Thus, in ethics, no convincing solution for the dichotomy of deontological versus teleological approaches (to name but one aspect) has so far been found. There are analogous problematic dichotomies: for example, the distinction "fact/value" or "individual/society" in social theory, "extension/intension" in semantics, "explanation/understanding" in philosophy of science, "emotion/cognition" in psychology, and many more.

This is no new problem. It is, among others, the myth of Oedipus articulating clearly the single-footedness of the swollenfooted man. The solution is also indicated in Oedipus's answer to the problem of the sphinx: Man is "poly-footed"¹. The reason for this poly-footedness was forgotten long ago. It is a kind of bifurcation, the criterion² at which a "rubberband" is fastened, and through this the neglected side pursues the one-dimensionality in an "Erinnic" way turning experience into an aporia.

Either the rubber band is torn, "rumpelstiltskin-like", not caring about the other side, or you are drawn back. The need is an important criterion.

In modern history, it is the thinking need or reason need which divides the world into subject and object, theory and practice (*Descartes, Kant* and others) - the head between the arms of the X, as it were - regarding the other side, the non-thinking pressure as secondary. This force appears, according to *Hegel, Kierkegaard, Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, Freud* and *Lacan*, as the deeper-located criterion between the thighs of X.

Today we have arrived at the centre of centres at the Delphic navel which nurtures these two hearts. Just as thinking can only move within the medium of differentiation (intellect) and integration (reason), the primary feeling can only exist through dissociation (unease) and unity (ease).

At primary stages, both structures are the same. Thinking in the form of the elementary predication " $x \in P$ " and " $x \notin P$ " is analogous to satisfaction and dissatisfaction³. The first semiosis points it out more precisely: separation of A into B and \bar{B} .



B symbolizes \bar{B} and vice versa. Through the interpretation of the symbol (Gr. symbolon = putting together) which takes place at the moment of reintegration of B and \bar{B} into A, they are partially

1 cf. *Sophokles*, King Oedipus, 715ff; also *Lexikon der Mythen und Gestalten*, München 1985. The day-night-mystery is also important which can be interpreted as the prototype of the generation of need and satisfaction situations. Cf. Also Aischylos' Eumenides.

2 Criterion is the reason for difference. It is derived from gr. κρινω = separate, devide.

3 Cf. *G. Frege*, Funktion, Begriff, Bedeutung. Göttingen 1969, p.21f, also *L. Wittgenstein*, Bemerkungen über die Philosophie der Psychologie, Frankfurt 1984 (362).

dissolved⁴.

To put it shortly, we think that the dichotomy of the situation of need and the situation of satisfaction represents the basic structure of Man and that the transition of this dichotomy into its termination represents the basic dynamics of Man.

A central point of this is the need, it is not only the object, but also a methodical element of this essay. Starting from complex reality, we use a de-differentiating procedure which ends up with this basic structure and dynamics, and tries to reconstruct from these the original complexity and ramifications (taking it to the point where even these efforts to reconstruct things as well as the cause of these efforts, i.e. the unease about the one-dimensionality and aporias, become reconstructable).

2. Sorts of Needs

The differentiation between situation of need and situation of satisfaction and their respective residues, unease and ease, as well as the resulting dynamics of permanent change are initially dealt with not only in mythology and pre-Socratic philosophy⁵. The ori-Gin of Man as an earth-born being⁶ implies his "condition humaine": birth "throws" Man into the world⁷, which means he is only part, split from the other part, the universe, the earth, the mother. The new world is the new mother.

Man's initial situation, the situation of need, has two aspects. On the one hand it is for him a *situation of entirety* into which he is "embedded"; at the same time it is a "*rupture*"⁸ for him implying separation and deficiency. On one hand the substitute (the new world) is the meaning

4 Sign and what it signifies are, at first stage, of the same nature, they are complementary. The separation is semiosis and the reintegration is sign interpretation. According to Peirce, sign is a thirdness (cf. *Ch.S.Peirce*, C.P. 1.339): B, B and the interpretant relating B and B to each other, relating being *matching*: two entities match – at the elementary stage – when they compose a whole. Composing a whole means - elementarily - experiencing the process of falling to pieces (*Wittgenstein*: „Die Welt ist, was der 'Fall' ist“), whereby the former is produced as a passed whole. Experiencing the process of breaking and constituting a whole in recollecting, presupposes importance, „significance“. In other words, it is this privation, this „dis-position“ that creates the need (the disposition) for the former whole. As a consequence, the first interpretant is the need (for the other) (cf. *Peirce*, C.P. 5.475, „the emotional interpretant“). At more complex stages the whole-part relation will be partially emancipated from the need (cf. *Wittgenstein*, Vortrag über Ethik, Frankfurt 1989, and *E. Levinas*, Die Spur des Anderen, Freiburg/München 1983). Man is able to be an „animal symbolicum“ (*E. Cassirer*) only by the fact that he is a fraction (cf. *Peirce*, C.P. 5.314 „man is a sign“). The structure of primary sign is constituted by the dual process of separation and recollection that becomes a dialectical game only in a further process of articulation. The thirdness of Peirce is an advanced one, if there have been more articulations.

5 Cf. Die Schöpfungsmythen, Darmstadt 1980, „Die Ankunft des Enki in Sumer“, p. 107F, and „Die Welt vor dem Erwachen“, p. 111. The god Horus (little Horus = child) is sheltered in Hathor (= the house of Horus). Compare the mandorlae, e.g. of Chartres or Exeter cathedrals, which show Jesus enfolded by the vagina. Egyptian temples show this symbolism clearly: the priest = child; the Holy water; the crossing of the threshold (cf. the door opening ceremonies of the divine shrine; Inmutef = „the pillar of his mother“; Nut, the „devouring house“; the entering of a world beyond with muted lights and tones. Cf. Also the magical circles; gr. $\tau\epsilon\mu\epsilon\nu\omicron\varsigma$ = the divine area, $\tau\omicron\mu\alpha\rho\omicron\iota$ = the dodoneic priests. Cf. also *E. Hornung*, Der Eine und die Vielen, Darmstadt 1983, and, for the general context, *Göttner-Abendroth*, Die Göttin und ihr Heros, München 1982².)

Parmenides' philosophy can be interpreted as follows: the goddess rediscovers to him the uteral world of the day-night-logic (= to be and not to be). The alteration is further well described by *Anaximander* and *Heraclitus*. This will be shown in another essay.


6 Humanus is derived from Lat. Humus = earth/ground. Thus humanus = earth-born man; cf. *E. Partridge*, Origins, 1963³. Cf. Also the important passages (116-125) in *Hesiod's* „Theogony“ which, by the way, are a generally excellent mythological „production“ of the need theses explicated in this article by the author.

7 Cf. *M. Heidegger*


8 Cf. the dismemberment motives of Egyptian and Greek provenance (Osiris and Orpheus/Dionysos). Cf. *M. Lurker*, Lexikon der Götter und Symbole, Darmstadt 1987.

of Man, his *factual* counterpart, on the other hand the memory of the "world beyond"⁹ (uteral old world) represents at the same time the situation of *deficiency* (i.e. normativity, cf. fact/value) which refers to that world.

The "immatriculation" in this situation is the sign interpretation "of this world", this world is my *immediate reference* (extension), the "exmatriculation" from that world beyond brings about the intention, the first rubber band¹⁰. The reference in the satisfaction situation is induced by both the reference of the need situation and its intention towards the satisfaction situation¹¹:



In the case of the child, the change, i.e. the termination of the need situation, happens by itself, just as its limitation happens by itself¹² in the new need situation. Thus we may say that, to the child, the situations generate out of each other. The child's structure consists of two parts¹³:



Through this alteration the situations become concrete, by means of the residues, as focal centres in the form of emotion, reference and intention types (we cannot yet speak of intensions, although they are associated with the situations and their types and their transformation into types).

First the feeling of uneasiness is transformed into a type of *feeling of deficiency*, the intention into *need of* and the feeling of ease in the *fulfilling fact*.

For example: Hunger, as a feeling of deficiency, articulates itself as a need to eat; eating being the fulfilling fact¹⁴. The feeling of deficiency shows the structure of the directed difference need for/to; at this point the feeling of ease does not show any inner structure, but only entirety. As this "basic need" is characterized by its tendency to unity (with the mother), we call this stage a "maternal" one and the need a "*maternal need*"¹⁵.

9 Cf. *Plato*

10 In analogy to matter and anti-matter which have, after being created from energy, the tendency to vanish, if they come close to each other.

11 In meditation this difference disappears, as it becomes entirely embedded and removes deficiency.

12 Cf. gr. $\pi\epsilon\rho\alpha\sigma$ = border (which is to be crossed); gr. $\pi\epsilon\rho\alpha\nu$ = beyond.

13 The need is reappearing ex nihilo. Another mode: n s(n) n' The need gets identifiable in n' as privation, the other is disposing me, is articulating its non-complementarity to me, its strangeness, its incompatibility. The act of birth is repeated, as it were (cf. the shock felt by the Pythagoreans at discovering the irrationality.)

14 At this stage differentiations between need, wish, desire, question, will, claim, expectation etc. which we will differentiate later are not yet made. Thus what is called „undifferentiated need“ here resembles *Lacan's* „wish“, which however, is only related to fantasy (cf. *Freud*) and, consequently, is too restricted. Need, on the other hand, is directed towards a special object, i.e. it is maternal (cf. *Freud*). Desire has a dialogical character; however, in *Lacan* desire is already expressed through language taking into account the unconscious of the other. Cf. *Lacan*, *Les formations de l'inconscient*, Bull. Psychologique, 1957-1958. If we take all these ideas in a way which is as undifferentiated as possible, we get the need concept used here.

15 a) It is important that the feeling of uneasiness has been a type from the very beginning, thus representing the irreducible knowledge aspect in the form of needs so that feeling and knowledge are components of the need.
b) *Racamier* tries to see, behind the psychotic defence, the need that wants to be satisfied in a passive way

Still, from the perspective of the mother, this situation appears in a different light: the structure does not consist of two, but as it is further developed, of three parts. There are many symptoms for the child's needs, the clearist of which is howling (Germ. schreien = Gr. χρεῖν = to need¹⁶. This howling is still without purpose; it becomes detached from the child, now forming part of the child as well as part of the mother as an intermediate sign¹⁷ of communication or parti-cipation (Germ. Mit-Teilung).



The mother has already transformed this emotional sign into a type, i.e. she interprets it by means of her knowledge.

This interpretation can either arouse sym-pathly or directly produce the situation of satisfaction¹⁸: the mother looks after the child (participation) which extinguishes the intermediate sign completely and the primary sign (mother-child) partly. Thus the cognitive aspect of the child is produced through the mother's interpretation by means of *her knowledge*; without this there would be no change of situation and, as a consequence, no transformation into a type either¹⁹.

But first, the child's interpretation is an emotional one, lying in the actual satisfaction through which the dual sign character (reference and intentionality) is extinguished. However, the satisfactions are

(mothering).

- 16 There is also a connection with „chaos“, cf *J. B. Hofmann*, Etymologisches Wörterbuch des Griechischen, München 1966, χαῖνω, χαῖρω etc.. In *Hesiod* chaos does not mean beginning (cf. above), but came itself into being, followed by the „big breasted“ mother.
- 17 When a sign itself (as a part) is designated as a part, the existential meaning is intended (esthetics, ethics, technology) (cf. *Franz Koppe*, Kunst als verklarte Weise, die Welt zu sehen. Zu *Nelson Goodman* und *Arthur C. Danto* in weitergehender Absicht, in: Perspektiven der Kunstphilosophie, Frankfurt 1991). In art an „intermediate sign“ can be reanimated by making it intransitive (cf. *Heidegger*: language speaks).
- 18 a) Cf. e.g. *Schopenhauer's* ethics of pity. It is clear that ethical theories excluding or suffocating this early stage are unacceptable. A general moral communication (argumentation) can only use the common meaning and logic of moral words. Learning moral words such as „you should“ makes sense only in concrete situations where someone demands something from me, and I, in some situations, do accept, whereas in others I do not, and vice versa (cf. The concept of „dialogue situations“ of *Kuno Lorenz*). To be moral against a being means – in this sense – to answer adequately to its demand (need).

(Adequacy has different stages. A mother answers adequately if she satisfies the needs of the new-born child. Later on, there will be a dialogue situation between the demanding person A and the demanded person B which defines the adequacy in case there is a contradiction between the need of A and the need of B: the dialogue will compare and analyze the needs. If B accepts the need of A, A has got a right towards B, and B, reciprocally, a duty towards A. That B should consider his own needs does not belong to the moral point of view, but to its counterpoint. The moral point of view implies the acceptance of relating one's own needs.)

There is no common logic in the style of *R.M. Hare*: generalization does not mean the social generalization of needs. That I have a need does not imply that all others have the same need, e.g. that I do not want to go to jail does not imply the same for somebody else, even if in this very case it may be probable (cf. *R.M. Hare*, Freiheit und Vernunft, Frankfurt 1983, p. 109ff). Here a moral dialogue would make the needs clear. The very special logic of moral words has the social function of founding moral norms binding everybody, which is quite another problem with other solutions.

Similarly, *Frankena* takes his own socialisation for a general one (cf. *W.K. Frankena*, München 1975², e.g. p. 45). *Apel* and *Habermas* would like to produce the acceptance of moral norms by a well-known meta-trick of necessary conditions of discourse. But this method, which is quite secondary, explains only the structure of *Apel's* and *Habermas's* own system, taking the constructed invariances of this system as necessary (cf. *J. Habermas*, Diskursethik; in: Moralbewusstsein und kommunikatives Handeln, Frankfurt 1983, e.g. p. 58ff, p. 75, p. 86ff).

b) A direct satisfaction is produced if, e.g., there is an immediate communication when the mother takes the child into her arms.

- 19 Here lies the social character of need constitution. On the other hand, the suffering of the child implies its irreducible subjectivity which, in its extremest form of absolute loneliness at the cross, is celebrated as most important feast by the protestants.

mere substitutes, i.e. they are not complete²⁰. The further development is based upon this phenomenon of deficiency. This may be the reason for eternal recurrence of deficiency.

Once a type has, as a result of this recurrence, been developed to a certain extent²¹, we are able to differentiate between the aspects of a *logical* (based upon a type) *expectation* on one hand, and a *psychological expectation* on the other. The psychological expectation remains a general one. However, the logical expectation consists of the orientation not towards some general, but towards some concrete satisfaction, for example, satisfaction through *eating*. However, this logical expectation (the elementary predication, as it were) may not materialize²². But as I am nevertheless satisfied²³ - I do not know how - this means the beginning of a new sequence of satisfaction situations, leading to a new kind of transformation into types. These situations - e.g. massaging the stomach - differentiate the feelings as *stomach ache* and *hunger* or, more immediately, as the need for a *massage* of the stomach and the need for *eating*.

We may call this differentiation a *differentiation between kinds of needs*, as the different needs are accompanied by different need feelings.

Another differentiation, without a differentiation of need feelings (except for the differentiation between pleasure and displeasure) consists in the variation of meals, for example. Let us assume the child has - up to now - formed the type *eating* by having milk pudding - seen from our own perspective - and is now fed with the variant "spinach" that also satisfies its feeling of hunger; it would form a new or, to be more precise, even two new sub-types *eating of milk pudding* and *eating of spinach* both of which are specialisations of the main type *eating* (basis of the rule of predicators " $x \in \textit{eating of milk pudding} \Rightarrow x \in \textit{eating}$ ")²⁴. We may call this differentiation a *differentiation into a need family*.

With respect to the solution of conflicts between opposing needs the antithesis "specialization/generalization" of needs becomes important. It corresponds to the relation "means/end" during the stage of "paternal" needs.

We should interrupt here the development of the material needs²⁵ to pursue two other sorts of needs which may be called "tekial" and "paternal".

They are two aspects of "self-creation" and of "self-individualization"²⁶.

The reason for the development of a further structure, the structure of *paternal needs* which consists of three parts (see above), is the extension of the need situation: the mother does not breast-feed the child at its first cry²⁷. The cry, as a sign of deficiency, becomes detached from the child (also from its own perspective) building up an intermediate situation, a *means situation*. The child soon realizes that it produces the cries itself (they are one of its first creations), but also realizes that cry variations entail different reactions: the mother comes more quickly, in a different way etc..

20 Cf. L. Wittgenstein, Vortrag über Ethik, Frankfurt 1989, p. 18f.

21 Cf. L. Wittgenstein, Vortrag über Ethik, p. 10.

22 A kind of the existentialist's „nothing“.

23 An aspect of *Parmenides'* „being“.

24 In terms of quantity the eating situations are larger, i.a. there are more eating situations, but it is because of this very fact that the type *eating* is more precise than the type *eating milk pudding*.

25 Continued in the article „Mathematical outline of material needs“.

26 a) If Aphrodite and Hermes are material figures, Prometheus and Athena/Apollo are tekial/paternal ones. Socrates and Jesus are the tekial counterparts of material Maria and Parmenides/Plato. b) Defence is, as it were, a first tekial answer and repetition of the birth fact. It is *Hegel's* negation of the negation.

The activity opposes the result of the activity through which the „unpleasurable affects“ have arisen. If this early negative answer is too intensive and the material need for positive unity is only directed at the remaining residue, we probably get what can be found in *Hegel's* „world spirit“ as „narcistic neurosis“

27 Present-day tendencies of „mothering“ seem to extend the foetal behaviour of especially many young people.

Thus the child has found and generated an instrumental action²⁸. This is the beginning of a long development of means and ends, of instrumental logic of A and non-A (appropriate and not appropriate)²⁹, of intentional signs of participation and communication, and so on.

This instrumentalization is partly the reason for many aporiae. It represents the core of structures of domination: the master is the end, the servant is the means³⁰. Our eco-systems are destroyed through the linear connection of means and ends. However, this one-sidedness and radicalization of the patril structure is not identical with the patril structure itself. Correspondingly, the one-sidedness and radicalization of the matril structure produces forms of fascist tendencies³¹. It obviously makes sense that Kant, speaking about his practical imperative, mentioned both sides³².

The matril dichotomy of specialization and generalization of needs takes on the form of "*means needs*" and "*end needs*" (see also fig.1, p.8).

We have to draw a distinction between "necessary" and "sufficient" means needs. A need is a *sufficient means need*, if its satisfaction implies the satisfaction of the end need; it is a *necessary means need*, if its non-satisfaction entails the non-satisfaction of the end need. Thus a *basic need* would be a need that cannot be interpreted as a means need on a certain means-end-line. A need that is a basic need on one line, may be means on another. Playing the piano, for instance, may be a basic need, if there is no further reason for me to do so (I do it just for fun); on another line it may be a means need (I do it for subsistence). Another example, including also the above-mentioned distinctions, would be the „freedom need“ which is not a basic, but a means need. For freedom means the chance of satisfying a given need (which implies there can be as many „freedoms“ as there are needs). In case freedom itself becomes a need, this chance does not exist of course. The achievement of freedom does not guarantee the satisfaction of the respective need; it only guarantees the chance. Thus, in certain situations, freedom is a necessary, but not sufficient means need.

This classification plays an important role with respect to the reconciliation of conflicting patril needs. If there are two conflicting needs n and m, one of them, m, interpretable as a sufficient, but not necessary means need, it can be replaced by another sufficient means need m* not conflicting with need n. If need n is a basic need and m is not a necessary means need, we can call m a „*false need*“ thus having a possibility to make this term scientifically clear³³.

Let us now proceed to the tekial needs. They are no needs of deficiency, but wealth or affluence needs which are satisfied by creation, production, separation and symbolization (fig.1).

In the view of patril needs the solution of the matril problem of under-satisfaction, because of an only partial unity, is the production of means; they try to draw satisfaction from these very means. Tekial needs, however, are per se needs for production, but not of and as means, but as „*ends in*

28 A more precise description of the genesis of instrumental actions is not possible here. But it should be pointed out that in this context *Freud's* concepts of fantasy and wish-fulfilment can be rather useful.

29 It is again *Parmenides* who identified this dual world in terms of logic transgressing it at the same time.

30 It has become historically obvious by now that *Hegel's* prioritization of the servant role in his master-servant dialectics cannot solve the problem. This structure cannot be overcome by monistic dialectics (cf. *Hegel, Phänomenologie des Geistes, Herrschaft und Knechtschaft.*) the phenomenological motto „zu den Sachen selbst“ can also be understood as a qualification of this reference. Cf. *A.F. Aguirre, Die Phänomenologie Husserls, Darmstadt 1982.*

31 However, the matril dissolution into the whole has its patril counterpart in terms of need. For it is the frustrated needs the ends of which justify the means.

32 „Handle stets so, dass du die Menschheit ... jederzeit *zugleich* als Zweck, niemals bloß als Mittel brauchst“, *Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten*, p. 79, Stuttgart 1970. It is natural that *Kant* remains orientated towards a system of ethics of reason of an apriori character; this ethics ascribes needs to nature which is of low quality from a logical point of view. The traditions influencing it are mainly based on *Plato* and *Descartes*.

33 There are still some other „matril“ clarifications (see the mathematical outline). Cf. Also note 43.

themselves“. They are esthetic needs of artists. One might say they realize the reason of the deficiency of matrial needs and imitate, from the contrary perspective, the mother-child-relation. It is those needs which now set the difference and the signs and articulate the latter (Gr. τεκνον = child Engl. token = sign; Gr. τεχνη = art). The both-and or neither-nor of the matrial needs is complemented by an either-or of the tekial needs³⁴.

It seems that the duality of matrial and tekial also appears as early as in ancient Greece: in the first epos, *Homer's Iliad*³⁵. Other important examples are *Empedocle*: love and hate; *Socrates*: social need and daimon; Jesus: all Men are equal before God (= mother), and death at the cross as extremest sign of individualization; and *Nietzsche* whose Dionysian and Apollonian concepts are equivalent to matrial and tekial.

The duality of patrial and tekial/matrial has become particularly apparent since the end of the 19th century: in *Schönberg* (destruction of tonality, i.e. the hierarchy of tones), in *Hofmannsthal* (letter by Lord Chandos, destruction of patrial object constitution), in *Kandinsky* (destruction of patrial concreteness), in *Freud* (psychological destruction of full control through consciousness and will), in *Adorno* (negative dialectics and destruction of totality), in *Heidegger* (recovery of matrial existence, of tekial „Eigentlichkeit“ as opposed to patrial technology), in *Wittgenstein* (mainly his later works: abolition of the monism of substantiality of the world and return to a philosophy of „embedding“)³⁶. The substantialities of Ego, object and truth etc. are products of patrial need structures (thus being partially justified)³⁷.

Tekial needs appear very early. The first works of art are of acustic character: tonal creations as parts of speechsongs. They also can be patrialized, i.e. instrumentalized for matrial needs. If this does not happen, they remain, to use a patrial term, „ends in themselves“, „creations for the sake of creations“, and this is their very structure.

It is the basis of the understanding of one's own matrial deficiency, as it is this process of disconnection that implies one's own production of the matrial need. The fathering of the child does not only mean happiness (the tekial equivalent of the matrial satisfaction), but also - because of the separation - pain. Giving (the thing given = the positive thing) is fulfilment as well as a potential deficiency need; i.e. it wants a gift back³⁸ which is the basis of mutual communication taking place for the first time through the exchange of smiles and words, visual and acustic esthetic achievements.

In terms of grammar this is expressed by the double genitive: the picture of the mother is the picture given by the mother to the child (genitivus objectivus) as well as the picture that shows the mother (gen. Subj.). Those linguistic philosophers who declare sentences as basic elements³⁹ make the mistake of ignoring the communicative function. It is not the sentence that forms the unity, but the

34 Cf. *Plato's* dialectics in the dialogue „Parmenides“ and the one-sided „both-and“ of *Hegel's* dialectics. See also *Kierkegaard's* category of the Individual, *Camus'* concept of the absurd and *Sartre's* concept of liberty. Generally existentialists are tekial. Cf. also *Kant's* „tekial“ concept of spontaneity which is supposed to guarantee the proper sphere of morality and freedom.

35 Hector is primarily found on the matrial side, Achilles on the tekial one. Cf. *Homer, Iliad, L. Voit*, *Homer in der Geschichte*, München 1983⁸. Another interpretation gives *Christa Wolf*, *Kassandra*, Frankfurt 1991.

36 Cf. *Tractatus 1.1* and *Philosophische Untersuchungen (PU) §§ 437-445, §§ 105-8. Wittgenstein* does not give up his one-sided concentration on the type (observing, language etc.) The „eigentliches Bedürfnis“ (we might say the matrial need) becomes the pivot of the changing perspective. The crystalline purity of the ideal logic and of the isolated sentence (patrial aspect) is given up in favour of family structures.

37 *Kant*, following *Hume*, realizes that when he converts these substances into regulative ideas, however, he over-emphasizes the patrial element with this highest useful reason.

38 Cf. *M. Mauss*, *Sociologie et anthropologie*, Paris, 1985⁹.

39 Cf. early *Wittgenstein* in *Tractatus 1.1, 3., 3.1., 4.001..* Later he changes his view. Cf. also *PU* and *Kuno Lorenz*, *Elemente der Sprachkritik*, Frankfurt, 1971.

sentence along with its complementary sentence, the question and the answer. The initial sense of the sentence does not consist of its form of occurrence, and its meaning does not consist of its truth-value; instead sense as well as meaning are found in the answer, just as the child's sense and meaning is the mother⁴⁰.

The syntax of our language also reflects the various sorts of needs: patrial nominalization, matrial non-reversible genitives (Germ. *Haustür* ≠ *Türhaus* Türhaus), tekial articulations.




Fig.1: Origin and classification of needs

As a fourth and last sort of need we have to mention briefly the *transformational needs*. While the matrial and tekial needs possess a whole-part and the patrial needs a means-end structure, the transformational needs possess a dynamic process character rather than a structure. As they usually occur after integrations, developing in abundance and tekializing then in semiosis, they may be called *intermediary*.

Matrial effects occur in the satisfaction and realization of concepts, i.e. in the "matricization" of types, the embedding of types into situations as well as in the constitution of object and subject, and in organizations. Tekial elements occur in the generation of situations, in differentiations, articulations etc., patrial ones occur in instrumentalizations and substantializations, and intermediary ones in transformations into types, processes of ripening, etc..

3. Objectivity and Intersubjectivity of Needs

The above scheme does not mean that needs are objective in such a way that on one side there is the understanding subject (or science), and on the other there are the facts, since subject, facts and

40 „Question“ means inquiry, request and thus demand, compulsion etc., so that in the dialogue situation (*Kuno Lorenz*) of question and answer we can also see the duality of need and satisfaction. The logical necessity results from the need to make ourselves understood (in *Parmenides*' logic has the same function).

objects themselves are constructions of the different needs. Only the initial situation of birth and its separation, i.e. its deficiency, are objective in the sense that they are given; the basis type character, along with the residues of uneasiness and extinguished uneasiness, is also objective in that sense⁴¹.

Only the initial material stage is given. Everything else must be understood as construction by needs arising from the given situations. It is in the first place the initial situation of birth that is - seen from our perspective - objective in the sense that it constitutes elements of a common world (although, on the other hand, it is not common); the same is true of what is constructed in situations together with other people.

Looking at our present situation, we realize that we share not only common ground in the form of agreements, but also in the form of disagreements. There are different methods of examining the usefulness of agreements and the extent to which disagreements can be overcome (as shown above), but all of them have to work to achieve the goal; they must not only just „maintain agreement“. In this sense there is no need of agreement.

From this point of view the whole theoretical and metatheoretical outline is just a text that does not possess objectivity; it is, to a certain extent, a question that requires an answer in order to gain objectivity.

A need theory cannot replace political agreement; it can only suggest how to structure an agreement. It is, in certain parts, a partial theory of the solution of conflicts, as we tried to outline in the discussion of means needs and end needs. Of course it is one-sided, only partial.

Another material variant will be outlined more precisely in the mathematical essay.

Perhaps some hope of finding fundamental agreement lies in the application of chaos theory and fractal geometry of *Mandelbrot* et al. to the need genesis.

Let us briefly conceptualize this idea: Within the framework of a mathematical situation theory which presupposes the two forms of situations, the need situation and the satisfaction situation, the alteration and difference between these two can be shown by a function: the *difference-mapping* which assigns the satisfaction situation as an image of the respective need situation. If we understand this first step of difference-mapping as fixed or stable (probably the stability could also be generated), we can apply a second step to the first image, which produces another need situation. If we apply the composition of these two mappings, as a stable mapping procedure, to the original need situation n times, we get „*limit images*“ of the original need situation, and in an analogous way of the satisfaction situation. This mapping may generate, under certain circumstances, the same limit images and thus the same intersubjective articulations of needs and satisfactions⁴². It is important that this may happen independently of the original situation; the limit images depend alone on the difference-mappings. Examples of such intersubjective difference-mappings would be natural or social cycles as well as language limitations.

4. Methodological Need Differentiations

Our brief outline of the development of a need theory up to now already provides methodological means to structure needs: There are specialized and generalized needs, means needs and end needs, basic needs and derived needs.

41 The sequence of the feeling of „uneasiness“ (and „ease“, respectively) is, at the beginning, given without any criteria of comparison. For uneasiness can, at the point, neither be compared nor be differentiated; it does not yet bear any signs, expect for ease.

42 A quantified definition of these functions has shown that different people may have different need structures: some are very constant, others have four or more „limit cycles“. It is possible that there may also be „chaotic attractors“ of some needs which could signify total desorientation.

With respect to the first material pair of needs the difference between kinds of needs is more important than the difference between families, since the latter are without emotional basis. It is a field of various socio-cultural shapings such as language and standardized behaviour, as its differentiations lie solely in the component of the "type" (logical expectation). We will deal with the importance of the differentiation between kinds of needs in the mathematical part.

The second and the third (paternal) pair play an important role as to the solution of need conflicts. By means of them we can define a "false" need⁴³.

Furthermore, the differentiation can be useful to resolve certain conceptual paradoxes, as we have already suggested with respect to the freedom concept. A differentiation between object needs and meta-needs which can already be made at the material stage, may similarly help to clear up paradoxes.

If I feel the need to realize, to change, to "disentangle" etc. my needs, we can speak of a meta-need. Generally speaking, a need may be called a *meta-need*, if it refers to the transformation into types of one or more other needs. A need that does not, in that sense, refer to other needs, may be called *object-need*. Examples of such an object-need would be the need to eat, or the fundamental need of esthetics; however, the latter also occurs in the form of a meta-need (e.g. the need of organizing expressions of other needs).

Meta-needs only exist in the development of sequences of situations out of other sequences of situations. There are the same circumstances for any kind of formal knowledge which is why this knowledge is always a posteriori, even if it would like to be a synthetic a priori⁴⁴.

The need of „sense“ (*Viktor Frankl*) is neither basic nor an object-need but results from the experience that all „essential“ needs are blocked. Originally, it is the very satisfaction of needs that constitutes sense.

The need of security (*A. Maslow*) is not a basic need either, in any rational sense of the word. Security also refers to principally any object, or even to a meta-need the satisfaction of which is uncertain; hence it is a means need or a meta-need.

Likewise the needs of health, life, pleasure, lust etc. are neither basic needs nor object-needs. They are just general characteristics of any satisfaction situation and therefore useless as distinctive concepts. They can even serve as indicators of incompleteness or total lack of satisfaction.

In the same way the „need of need satisfaction“ (*Jean Ferdinand Weber*) is a meta-need of general and potentially pathological character. At this point the fundamental difference of deficiency and satisfaction tends to fade as a result of severe frustration.

Another interesting problem is how the polarity of needs must be understood. Do needs come into existence simultaneously, in a relation to each other (such as specialized/generalized needs), or does every impulse have a polar end, a polar direction, or does the monistic end always move

43 We largely agree with *A. Heller's* analysis in „Human Needs“, ed. *K. Lederer*, Königstein/T., 1980, „can 'True' and 'False' Needs be posited“, although she merges different aspects in one (like *Kant*): the problem of contradiction which occurs in different variants, both in the material and the paternal sphere, and the moral problem. I am referring to the problem of contradiction which forms a nucleus of *Heller's* concept, along with the moral problem (in the strict sense of the word); this consists of an at least symbolical adoption of the other's need as my own possible need. If I also use necessary mean needs and basic needs, respectively, I have left the material sphere and its possible solutions, finding myself in the paternal sphere instead. For the material explanation of „false needs“ see the mathematical outline.

44 The constants realized on the meta-level are then stated as necessary constituents of the object-level. If I repeat this on the meta-meta-level, I have, through a conjuring trick, produced the transcendental preconditions of all knowledge forms. Cf. Also note 18).

between two poles? It is the two last aspects that are interesting⁴⁵. This polarity of ends, a need schizophrasia, as it were, could be a tekial alternative of the matrial end monism, in form as well as in content.

Our Western thinking is indeed quite matrial after all. *Goethe's* „Faust“ with his redemption to the „good“, *Hegel's* dialectics with its creation of the respective „true whole“ are somewhat provincial indeed. Mephisto and the negation are not parts, with equal rights; they are only means of the ruse of reason (thus of patrial character), just as human needs in general were looked upon as means. It seems that along with end polarity something like a Japanese Koan becomes involved going to strike sufficiency as a whole.

5. Need Space and Time

Needs are closely connected with space and time. A general situation theory of needs would have to remove the linearity of situations, only taking them as a special case to examine particular needs; it would have to cut chains of neighbouring situations from a general topology of situations. In a two-dimensional section this would look as follows.




Fig.2: Time diagramme of needs.
With linear time directions,
the boundary lines denote
time horizons.

Time can only be abstracted and constructed on the basis of a topology. This is also shown by those time concepts that are expressed in space terms. The time arrow must become explicable, i.e. time must be constructable direction-free.

During the matrial stage, while the need is still undifferentiated, time is globally seen necessarily cyclic. As the need situation is immediately followed by the satisfaction situation, and as this satisfaction situation can only be followed by the same need situation etc., we observe an endless recurrence in the form of need situation and satisfaction situation (see p. 3). If we now look locally at the intentionality of matrial needs which consists of removing differences and bringing about unity, we realize that the time arrow from the present need to future satisfaction is entropical. It means loss of information. From satisfaction situation to need situation things are just opposite, and this regenerative arrow is directed against the matrial one. Seen from the knowledge aspect, however, the time arrow is negentropical in both directions. As much as need differentiation increases, the probability of global cyclicity decreases rapidly because cyclicity demands different needs to oscillate in harmony with each other.

While maintaining the tekial differences and the patrial substantializations, the matrial principle is able to organize these different needs into „essential needs“ and „by-needs“; thus a „main time“ is

45 Cf. the papers of *Schaeffer*, p.15, *Adl-Amini*, p. 57 in *Basic Human Needs, An Interdisciplinary and International View*, Frankfurt 1992.

separated from „by-times“⁴⁶. This main time makes cyclicity possible which is indispensable for time measurement. If the organizational power decreases, we come down several times again, as can be seen in the case of „mental illness“. However, such disintegration of time structure can be extremely productive and is sometimes even purposely applied.

In the patrial stage, the active future of satisfaction (the paradise promised) becomes important, mainly because of the longer duration of the need situation and the means situation thus produced (see the historical philosophies of *Hegel*, *Marx* and others).

Whereas there are, in the matrial/tekiel stage, two times in terms of quality - the need time and the satisfaction time - there are, in the patrial stage, three phases of time through the addition of means time.

These three times correspond to the topoi of anthropology: the first time, the time of deficiency, is the topos of the animal, the means time is the topos of Man, and the third one the topos of God or gods. As *Heraclitus* says: Man is the being between animal and God (cf. *Freud's* distinction of Id, Ego and Superego)⁴⁷.


6. Subject Constitution and Object Constitution

The reference of needs, means and satisfactions to their respective situations generates, through transformation into types, preliminary undifferentiated „pre-objects“, e.g. hunger or eating or bottle or light etc..

These are „coloured“, according to the kind of situation, and appear as „torn“ pre-objects (see *M. Klein*) of matrial/patrial need situations, as „means“ pre-objects of instrumental actions, and as "perfect" pre-objects (cf. *Parmenides*).

Since, however, the reference in the satisfaction situation is induced by the intention and by the reference in the need situation, even perfect pre-objects remain torn to a certain extent⁴⁸.

Restricting to the essential of the matrial and patrial needs, to their intentionality („the arrows of Apollo and of Artemis“) we will call them „ghedors“⁴⁹. These arrows with given directions and yet undifferentiated duration, different intensities, are commuting with their interspace schematically, which are free from directions (the satisfaction situations). To each arrow we are mapping a pre-object in the interesting situations. It is essential for pre-objects getting objects that the ghedors are synchronically swinging: in the most simple case there would be a self-generated matrix of two ghedors g^1 and g^2 with two dimensions in time:



46 The organization form of synergetics (developed by *H. Haken* and others) might also be of importance in this context.

47 Cf. *Kuno Lorenz*, Einführung in die Anthropologie, Saarbrücken 1990, p.25. The following terms „pre-object“, „pre-subject“ etc. are taken from *Kuno Lorenz*, but, as I think, not necessarily in the same sense.

48 See the development of the Greek atomic theory by *Leukipp/Democritus* following *Parmenides*.

49 Since the indoeuropean roots of need probably can be determined on the one hand in „ghe“ (Germ. gern, ge = unification), Gr. χρεω = need etc.) - the patrial part of need – and on the other hand in „de“ (Germ. dürfen, binden, gr. δεω = must).

During the overlay of the ghedors (for example, let g^1 be the need of communication and g^2 the need to drink) pre-objects (for example the face and the breast in the satisfaction situation) are integrated to objects, which are – depending on the importance and emphasis of the respective ghedor – structured to „face with breast“ or „breast with face“. The stressed component is defining the nature of the object, the unaccentuated is getting the additional property of the object (συμβεβηκος).

The reason why constant and intersubjective beings exist at all lies in the constancy and intersubjectivity of need frustrations and their hierarchy. However, construction of objects does not necessarily have to be organized hierarchically, as can for example be seen in Egyptian art with its parallel arrangements, its „aspective“⁵⁰; or in the well-known Hopi language in which we do not only find a white horse, but also a "horsy"white, which means the same thing.

The construction of a psychological subject (the "I") is partly comparable to the above suggested construction; the subject is also constituted from pre-subjects in connection with means times. Further constructional efforts must be based upon communication, action, language, argumentation, differentiation between common and individual objects and subjects.

50 Cf. *E. Brunner-Traut*, Frühformen des Erkennens, Darmstadt 1990.